Abstract This paper discusses a numerical scheme for computing the Banzhaf swing probability when votes are neither equiprobable nor independent. Examples indicate a substantial bias in the Banzhaf measure of voting power if neither assumption is met. The analytical part derives the exact magnitude of the bias due to the common probability of an affirmative vote deviating from one half and due to common correlation in unweighted simple-majority games. The former bias is polynomial, the latter is linear. A modified square-root rule for two-tier voting systems that takes into account both the homogeneity and the size of constituencies is also provided.
Introduction
Despite their respectable age, the power indices proposed by Penrose (1946) and Banzhaf (1965), or Shapley and Shubik (1954) , henceforth Bz and SSI, remain a popular choice in empirical work. Both indices measure the distribution of a priori voting power that follows from the constitution and rules of a voting body alone. However, voting situations, both hypothetical and real, exist in which the two indices yield markedly different results. Which index to use therefore becomes a question of practical importance in the empirical work.
To answer this question, Straffin (1977) derives probabilistic models consistent with each of the two indices. He shows that, depending on the distribution of the voting poll, the expected individual effect of each member of a voting body on the outcome of voting numerically coincides with either the SSI or Bz measure. Straffin's prescription for empirical work is as follows: "If we believe that voters in a certain body have S. Kaniovski (B) Austrian Institute of Economic Research (WIFO), P.O. Box 91, 1103 Vienna, Austria e-mail: serguei.kaniovski@wifo.ac.at such common standards, the Shapley-Shubik index might be most appropriate; if we believe voters behave independently, the Banzhaf index is the instrument of choice" (Straffin 1994 (Straffin , p. 1137 . The question explored in this paper is: What is the error of an empirical researcher who, following Straffin's prescription, applies the Bz measure to a voting body in which Straffin's Independence Assumption is not met?
To answer this question, I compute the bias of the Bz absolute measure of power in reflecting a voter's probability of being decisive when the votes are neither equiprobable nor independent. I use a numerical scheme to construct a joint probability distribution on the set of voting outcomes (coalitions) for given probabilities and correlation coefficients, and compare the Bz measure for this distribution to its equivalent in the case of equiprobable and independent votes. 1 Section 2 argues that the pairwise correlation as a model of stochastic dependence is sufficiently general for most empirical applications, including voting by blocs. Section 3 discusses a numerical scheme for computing the Bz swing probability when the votes are not equally probable and correlated, and shows how to estimate the probabilities and correlation coefficients from ballot data. Section 4 presents an analytical derivation of the exact magnitude of the bias due to the common probability of a YES vote deviating from one half and due to common correlation in unweighted simple-majority games. Section 5 derives a modified Penrose's square-root rule in the case of correlated votes. The last section concludes.
Straffin's probabilistic voting models
Let p i be the probability that member i votes YES. Straffin (1977) introduces two probabilistic assumptions: "Independence Assumption: The p i 's are selected independently from the uniform distribution on [0, 1]. or: Homogeneity Assumption: A number p is selected from the uniform distribution on [0, 1], and p i = p for all i" (p. 112). He then proceeds to prove two well-known characterization theorems. Theorem 1 states that under the Independence Assumption the probability of the ith member's vote being decisive, or the ith expected individual effect on the outcome of voting, coincides with the Banzhaf measure of voting power for i
Here η i is the number of coalitions in which i is decisive, and n the total number of members. The Banzhaf index is obtained by normalizing β i 's to add up to unity, which unfortunately destroys its probabilistic meaning. Theorem 2 makes a similar statement for the Homogeneity Assumption and the SSI. The crucial assumption in both models is that each member votes independently. This is evident from the proofs, both of which rely on multilinear extensions of a
